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1 Technical Appendix
1.1 Optimality conditions
1.1.1 Firm’s problem
The profit function is maximized when the derivatives of that function are set to zero.
Therefore, the optimal amount of capital - holding the level of technology At and labor input
Npt constant - is determined by setting the derivative of the profit function with respect to
Kpt equal to zero. This derivative is
(1− θ)At(Kpt )−θ(Npt )θ(Kgt )ν − rt = 0 (1)
where (1 − θ)At(Kpt )−θ(Npt )θ(Kgt )ν is the marginal product of capital because it expresses
how much output will increase if capital increases by one unit. The economic interpretation
of this First-Order Condition (FOC) is that in equilibrium, firms will rent capital up to
the point where the benefit of renting an additional unit of capital, which is the marginal
product of capital, equals the rental cost, i.e the interest rate.
rt = (1− θ)At(Kpt )−θ(Npt )θ(Kgt )ν (2)
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Now, multiply by Kpt and rearrange terms. This gives the following relationship:
Kpt (1− θ)At(Kpt )−θ(Npt )θ(Kgt )ν = rtKpt or (1− θ)Yt = rtKpt (3)
because
Kpt (1− θ)At(Kpt )−θ(Npt )θ(Kgt )ν = At(Kpt )1−θ(Npt )θ(Kgt )ν = (1− θ)Yt
To derive firms’ optimal labor demand, set the derivative of the profit function with respect
to the labor input equal to zero, holding technology and capital constant:
θAt(K
p
t )
1−θ(Npt )
θ−1(Kgt )
ν − wpt = 0 or wpt = θAt(Kpt )1−θ(Npt )θ−1(Kgt )ν (4)
In equilibrium, firms will hire labor up to the point where the benefit of hiring an additional
hour of labor services, which is the marginal product of labor, equals the cost, i.e the hourly
wage rate.
Now multiply both sides of the equation by Npt and rearrange terms to yield
Npt θAt(K
p
t )
1−θ(Npt )
θ−1(Kgt )
ν = wptN
p
t or θYt = w
p
tN
p
t (5)
Next, it will be shown that in equilibrium, economic profits are zero. Using the results above
one can obtain
Πt = Yt − rtKpt − wptNpt = Yt − (1− θ)Yt − θYt = 0 (6)
Indeed, in equilibrium, economic profits are zero.
1.1.2 Consumer problem
Set up the Lagrangian
L(Ct, Kpt+1, Npt ; Λt) = E0
∞∑
t=0
{[(Ct + ωGct)ψ(1−Nt)(1−ψ)]1−α − 1
1− α + (7)
+Λt
[
(1− τ l)(wptNpt + wgtN gt ) + (1− τ k)rtKpt +
+τ kδpKpt − (1 + τ c)Ct −Kpt+1 + (1− δ)Kpt
]}
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This is a concave programming problem, so the FOCs, together with the additional, bound-
ary (”transversality”) conditions for private physical capital and government bonds are both
necessary and sufficient for an optimum.
To derive the FOCs, first take the derivative of the Lagrangian w.r.t Ct (holding all other
variables unchanged) and set it to 0, i.e. LCt = 0. That will result in the following expression
βt
{
1− α
1− α
[
(Ct + ωG
c
t)
ψ(1−Nht )(1−ψ)
]−α
×
ψ(Ct + ωG
c
t)
ψ−1(1−Nht )(1−ψ) − Λt(1 + τ c)
}
= 0 (8)
Cancel the βt and the 1− α terms to obtain[
(Ct + ωG
c
t)
ψ(1−Nt)(1−ψ)
]−α
ψ(Ct + ωG
c
t)
ψ−1(1−Nt)(1−ψ) − Λt(1 + τ c) = 0 (9)
Move Λt to the right so that[
(Ct + ωG
c
t)
ψ(1−Nt)(1−ψ)
]−α
ψ(Ct + ωG
c
t)
ψ−1(1−Nt)(1−ψ) = Λt(1 + τ c) (10)
This optimality condition equates marginal utility of consumption to the marginal utility of
wealth.
Now take the derivative of the Lagrangian w.r.t Kpt+1 (holding all other variables unchanged)
and set it to 0, i.e. LKpt+1 = 0. That will result in the following expression
βt
{
− Λt + EtΛt+1
[
(1− τ k)rt+1 + τ kδp + (1− δp)
]}
= 0 (11)
Cancel the βt term to obtain
−Λt + βEtΛt+1
[
(1− τ k)rt+1 + τ kδp + (1− δp)
]
= 0 (12)
Move Λt to the right so that
βEtΛt+1
[
(1− τ k)rt+1 + τ kδp + (1− δp)
]
= Λt (13)
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Using the expression for the real interest rate shifted one period forward one can obtain
rt+1 = (1− θ) Yt+1
Kpt+1
βEtΛt+1
[
(1− τ k)(1− θ) Yt+1
Kpt+1
+ τ kδp + (1− δp)
]
= Λt (14)
This is the Euler equation, which determines how consumption is allocated across periods.
Take now the derivative of the Lagrangian w.r.t Npt (holding all other variables unchanged)
and set it to 0, i.e. LNpt = 0. That will result in the following expression
βt
{
1− α
1− α
[
(Ct + ωG
c
t)
ψ(1−Nt)(1−ψ)
]−α
×
(1− ψ)(Ct + ωGct)ψ(1−Nt)−ψ(−1) + Λt(1− τ l)wpt
}
= 0 (15)
Cancel the βt and the 1− α terms to obtain[
(Ct + ωG
c
t)
ψ(1−Nt)(1−ψ)
]−α
(1− ψ)
[
Ct + ωG
c
t
1−Nt
]ψ
(−1) + Λt(1− τ l)wpt = 0 (16)
Rearranging, one can obtain[
(Ct + ωG
c
t)
ψ(1−Nt)(1−ψ)
]−α
(1− ψ)(Ct + ωGct)ψ(1−Nt)−ψ = Λt(1− τ l)wpt (17)
Plug in the expression for wht , that is,
wpt = θ
Yt
Npt
(18)
into the equation above. Rearranging, one can obtain[
(Ct + ωG
c
t)
ψ(1−Nt)(1−ψ)
]−α
(1− ψ)(Ct + ωGct)ψ(1−Nt)−ψ = Λt(1− τ l)θ
Yt
Npt
(19)
Transversality conditions need to be imposed to prevent Ponzi schemes, i.e borrowing bigger
and bigger amounts every subsequent period and never paying it off.
lim
t→∞
βtΛtK
p
t+1 = 0 (20)
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1.1.3 The Objective Function of a Public Sector Union: Derivation
This subsection shows that the objective function in the government sector is a generalized
version of Stone-Geary monopoly union utility function used in Dertouzos and Pencavel
(1981) and Brown and Ashenfelter (1986). The utility function is
V (wg, N g) = (wg − w¯g)φ(N g − N¯ g)(1−φ), (21)
where φ and 1− φ are the weights attached to public wage and hours, respectively, and w¯g
and N¯ g denote subsistence wage rate and hours. Since there is no minimum wage in the
model, w¯g = 0. Additionally, as public hours are assumed to be unproductive, it follows
that N¯ g = 0 as well. Therefore, the utility function simplifies to
V (wg, N g) = (wg)φ(N g)(1−φ). (22)
Doiron (1992) uses a generalized representation, which encompasses (2) as a special case
when ρ→ 0. [
φ(N g)−ρ + (1− φ)(wg − w¯)−ρ
]−1/ρ
, (23)
when w¯ = 0, the function simplifies to[
φ(N g)−ρ + (1− φ)(wg)−ρ
]−1/ρ
, (24)
Union objective function used in the paper is very similar to Doiron’s (1992) simplified
version: [
(N g)ρ + η(wg)ρ
]1/ρ
, (25)
can be transformed to [
(N g)ρ +
φ
(1− φ)(w
g)ρ
]1/ρ
, (26)
Collecting terms under common denominator[
(1− φ)
(1− φ)(N
g)ρ +
φ
(1− φ)(w
g)ρ
]1/ρ
, (27)
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Factoring out the common term[
1
1− φ
]1/ρ[
(1− φ)(N g)ρ + φ(wg)ρ
]1/ρ
, (28)
Note that the constant term
[
1
1−φ
]1/ρ
> 0 can be ignored, as utility functions are invariant
to positive affine transformations. After rearranging terms, the equivalent function
V˜ =
[
φ(wg)ρ + (1− φ)(N g)ρ
]1/ρ
. (29)
Take natural logarithms from both sides to obtain
ln V˜ =
1
ρ
ln
[
φ(wg)ρ + (1− φ)(N g)ρ
]
. (30)
Take the limit ρ→ 0
lim
ρ→0
ln V˜ = lim
ρ→0
ln
[
φ(wg)ρ + (1− φ)(N g)ρ
]
ρ
(31)
Apply L’Hopital’s Rule on the R.H.S. to obtain
lim
ρ→0
ln V˜ = lim
ρ→0
∂
∂ρ
ln
[
φ(wg)ρ + (1− φ)(N g)ρ
]
∂ρ
∂ρ
(32)
Thus
ln V˜ = lim
ρ→0
[
φ(wgt )
ρ lnwg + (1− φ)(N g)ρ lnN g
]
/
[
φ(wg)ρ + (1− φ)(N g)ρ
]
1
(33)
Simplify to obtain
ln V˜ =
limρ→0
[
φ(wgt )
ρ lnwg + (1− φ)(N g)ρ lnN g
]
limρ→0
[
φ(wg)ρ + (1− φ)(N g)ρ
] = φ lnwg + (1− φ) lnN g
φ+ (1− φ) (34)
Therefore,
ln V˜ = φ lnwg + (1− φ) lnN g. (35)
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Exponentiate both sides of the equation to obtain
eln V˜ = eφ lnw
g+(1−φ) lnNg . (36)
Thus
V˜ = eln(w
g)φ+ln(Ng)(1−φ) . (37)
or
V˜ = eln(w
g)φ(Ng)(1−φ) . (38)
Finally,
V˜ = (wg)φ(N g)(1−φ) (39)
Furthermore, government period budget constraint serves the role of a labor demand func-
tion. Additionally, the public sector demand curve will be subject to shock, resulting from
innovations to the fiscal shares. The balanced budget assumption is thus important in the
model setup. Since wage bill is a residual, if wage rate is increased, then hours need to be
decreased. Additionally, government period budget constraint can be expressed in the form
N g = N g(wg) as
N g =
τ lwpNp + τ k(r − δp)Kp + τ cC −Gc −Gi −Gt
(1− τ l)wg (40)
Therefore, the problem in the government sector is reshaped in the standard formulation in
the union literature:
max
wg ,Ng
V (wg, N g) s.t. N g = N g(wg) (41)
Since union optimizes over both the public wage and hours, the outcome is efficient. The
solution pair is on the contract curve (obtained from FOCs), at the intersection point with
the labor demand curve (government budget constraint).
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1.1.4 Public sector union optimization problem
The union solves the following problem:
max
wgt ,N
g
t
[
(N gt )
ρ + η(wgt )
ρ
]1/ρ
(42)
s.t
Gct +G
t
t +G
i
t + w
g
tN
g
t = τ
cCt + τ
krtK
p
t − τ kδpKt + τ l[wptNpt + wgtN gt ] (43)
Setup the Lagrangian
V(wgt , N gt ; νt) = max
wgt ,N
g
t
{[
(N gt )
ρ + η(wgt )
ρ
]1/ρ
(44)
−νt
[
Gct +G
t
t +G
i
t + w
g
tN
g
t − τ cCt − τ krtKpt + τ kδpKt − τ l[wptNpt + wgtN gt ]
]}
Optimal public employment is obtained, when the derivative of the government Lagrangian
is et to zero, i.e VNgt = 0
(1/ρ)
[
(N gt )
ρ + η(wgt )
ρ
](1/ρ)−1
ρ(N gt )
ρ−1 − (1− τ l)νtwgt = 0 (45)
or, when ρ is canceled out and (1− τ l)νtwgt put to the right[
(N gt )
ρ + η(wgt )
ρ
](1/ρ)−1
(N gt )
ρ−1 = (1− τ l)νtwgt (46)
Optimal public wage is obtained, when the derivative of the government Lagrandean is et
to zero, i.e Vwgt = 0
(1/ρ)
[
(N gt )
ρ + η(wgt )
ρ
](1/ρ)−1
ηρ(wgt )
ρ−1 − (1− τ l)νtN gt = 0 (47)
or, when ρ is canceled out and(1− τ l)νtN gt term put to the right[
(N gt )
ρ + η(wgt )
ρ
](1/ρ)−1
η(wgt )
ρ−1 = (1− τ l)νtN gt (48)
Divide (11.1.46) and (11.1.48) side by side to obtain[
(N gt )
ρ + η(wgt )
ρ
](1/ρ)−1
(N gt )
ρ−1
[
(N gt )
ρ + η(wgt )
ρ
](1/ρ)−1
η(wgt )
ρ−1
=
(1− τ l)νtwgt
(1− τ l)νtN gt
(49)
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Cancel out the common terms
(N gt )
ρ−1
η(wgt )
ρ−1 =
wgt
N gt
(50)
Now cross-multiply to obtain
(N gt )
ρ
η
= (wgt )
ρ (51)
Hence
wgt =
(
1
η
)1/ρ
N gt (52)
The wage bill expression, which is obtained after simple rearrangement of the government
budget constraint, is as follows
wgtN
g
t =
τ cCt + τ
krtK
p
t − τ kδpKt + τ lwptNpt −Gct −Gtt −Git
1− τ l (53)
Use the wage bill equation and the relationship between public wage and employment in
order to obtain
wgt = η
− 1
2ρ
[
τ cCt + τ
krtK
p
t − τ kδpKt + τ lwptNpt −Gct −Gtt −Git
1− τ l
] 1
2
(54)
and
N gt = η
1
2ρ
[
τ cCt + τ
krtK
p
t − τ kδpKt + τ lwptNpt −Gct −Gtt −Git
1− τ l
] 1
2
(55)
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1.2 Log-linearized model equations
1.2.1 Linearized market clearing
ct + k
p
t+1 + g
c
t + g
i
t − (1− δp)kpt = yt (56)
Take logs from both sides to obtain
ln[ct + k
p
t+1 + g
c
t + g
i
t − (1− δp)kpt ] = ln(yt) (57)
Totally differentiate with respect to time
d ln[ct + k
p
t+1 + g
c
t + g
i
t − (1− δp)kpt ]
dt
= d ln(yt) (58)
[
1
c+ gc + gi + δpkp
][
dct
dt
c
c
+
dgct
dt
g
g
+
dgit
dt
gi
gi
+
dkpt+1
dt
kp
kp
− (1− δp)dk
p
t
dt
kp
kp
] =
dyt
dt
1
y
(59)
Define zˆ = dzt
dt
1
z
. Thus passing to log-deviations
1
y
[cˆtc+ gˆ
c
tg
c + gˆitg
i + kˆpt+1k
p − (1− δp)kˆpt kp] = yˆt (60)
cˆtc+ gˆ
c
tg
c + gˆitg
i + kˆpt+1k
p − (1− δp)kˆpt kp = yyˆt (61)
kpkˆpt+1 = yyˆt − ccˆt − gcgˆct − gigˆit + (1− δp)kpkˆpt (62)
1.2.2 Linearized production function
yt = at(k
p
t )
1−θ(npt )
θ(kgt )
ν (63)
Take natural logs from both sides to obtain
ln yt = ln at + (1− θ) ln kpt + θ lnnpt + ν ln kgt (64)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d ln yt
dt
=
d ln at
dt
+ (1− θ)d ln k
p
t
dt
+ θ
d lnnpt
dt
+ ν
d ln kgt
dt
(65)
1
y
dyt
dt
=
1
a
dat
dt
+
1− θ
kp
dkpt
dt
+
θ
np
dnpt
dt
+
ν
kg
dkgt
dt
(66)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
0 = −yˆt + (1− θ)kˆpt + aˆt + θnˆpt + νkˆgt (67)
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1.2.3 Linearized FOC consumption
[(ct + ωg
c
t )
ψ(1− nt)(1−ψ)]−αψ(ct + ωgct )ψ−1(1− nt)(1−ψ) = (1 + τ c)λt (68)
Simplify to obtain
ψ(ct + ωg
c
t )
ψ−1−αψ(1− nt)(1−α)(1−ψ) = (1 + τ c)λt (69)
Take natural logs from both sides to obtain
lnψ(ct + ωg
c
t )
ψ−1−αψ(1− nt)(1−α)(1−ψ) = ln(1 + τ c) + lnλt (70)
ln(ct + ωg
c
t )
ψ−1−αψ(1− nt)(1−α)(1−ψ) = ln(1 + τ c) + lnλt (71)
(ψ − 1− αψ) ln(ct + ωgct ) + (1− α)(1− ψ) ln(1− nt) = ln(1 + τ c) + lnλt (72)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
(ψ − 1− αψ)d ln(ct + ωg
c
t )
dt
+ (1− α)(1− ψ)d ln(1− nt)
dt
=
=
d ln(1 + τ c)
dt
+
d lnλt
dt
(73)
(ψ − 1− αψ) 1
c+ ωgc
(
dct
dt
+ ω
dgct
dt
) + (1− α)(1− ψ) −1
1− n
dnt
dt
=
dλt
dt
1
λ
(74)
(ψ − 1− αψ)
c+ ωgc
dct
dt
c
c
+
ω(ψ − 1− αψ)
c+ ωgc
dgct
dt
gc
gc
+
−(1− α)(1− ψ) 1
1− n
dnt
dt
n
n
=
dλt
dt
1
λ
(75)
c(ψ − 1− αψ)
c+ ωgc
cˆt +
ωgc(ψ − 1− αψ)
c+ ωgc
gˆct − (1− α)(1− ψ)
n
1− nnˆ = λˆt (76)
Since
nˆ =
np
np + ng
nˆp +
ng
np + ng
nˆg =
np
n
nˆp +
ng
n
nˆg, (77)
and consumers choose np only, pass to log-deviations to obtain
c(ψ − 1− αψ)
c+ ωgc
cˆt +
ωgc(ψ − 1− αψ)
cc + ωg
gˆct − (1− α)(1− ψ)
n
1− n
np
np + ng
nˆp = λˆt (78)
Since n = np + ng, it follows that
c(ψ − 1− αψ)
c+ ωgc
cˆt +
ωgc(ψ − 1− αψ)
c+ ωgc
gˆct − (1− α)(1− ψ)
np
1− nnˆ
p = 0 (79)
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1.2.4 Linearized no-arbitrage condition for capital
λt = βEtλt+1[(1− τ k)rt+1 + τ kδp + (1− δp)] (80)
Substitute out rt+1 on the right hand side of the equation to obtain
λt = βEt[λt+1((1− τ k)(1− θ)yt+1
kpt+1
+ τ kδp + 1− δp)] (81)
Take natural logs from both sides of the equation to obtain
lnλt = lnEt[λt+1((1− τ k)(1− θ)yt+1
kpt+1
+ τ kδp + 1− δp)] (82)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d lnλt
dt
=
d lnEt[λt+1((1− τ k)(1− θ) yt+1kpt+1 + τ
kδp + 1− δp)]
dt
(83)
1
λ
dλt
dt
= Et
{
1
λ((1− τ k)(1− θ) y
kp
+ 1− δp + τ kδp ×[
((1− τ k)(1− θ) y
kp
+ τ kδp + 1− δp)dλt+1
dt
λ
λ
+
λ(1− τ k)(1− θ)
kp
dyt+1
dt
y
y
−
[
λ(1− τ k)(1− θ)y
(kp)2
]
dkpt+1
dt
kp
kp
]}
(84)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
λˆt = Et
{
λˆt+1 +
[
(1− τ k)(1− θ)y
((1− τ k)(1− θ) yt+1
kpt+1
+ τ kδp + 1− δp)kp yˆt+1
− (1− τ
k)(1− θ)y
((1− θ) yt+1
kpt+1
+ τ kδp + 1− δp)kp kˆ
p
t+1
]}
(85)
Observe that
(1− τ k)(1− θ)yt+1
kpt+1
+ τ kδp + 1− δp = 1/β (86)
Plug it into the equation to obtain
λˆt = Et
[
λˆt+1 +
β(1− τ k)(1− θ)y
kp
yˆt+1 − β(1− τ
k)(1− θ)y
kp
kˆpt+1
]
(87)
λˆt = Etλˆt+1 +
β(1− τ k)(1− θ)y
kp
Etyˆt+1 − β(1− τ
k)(1− θ)y
kp
Etkˆ
p
t+1 (88)
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1.2.5 Linearized MRS
(1− ψ)(ct + ωgct ) = ψ(1− nt)
(1− τ l)
(1 + τ c)
θ
yt
npt
(89)
Take natural logs from both sides of the equation to obtain
ln(1− ψ)(ct + ωgct ) = lnψ(1− nt)
(1− τ l)
(1 + τ c)
θ
yt
npt
(90)
ln(ct + ωg
c
t ) = ln(1− nt) + ln yt − lnnpt (91)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d ln(ct + ωg
c
t )
dt
=
d ln(1− nt)
dt
+
d ln yt
dt
− d lnn
p
t
dt
(92)
1
c+ ωgc
(
dct
dt
+ ω
dgct
dt
) = − 1
1− n
dnt
dt
+
1
y
dyt
dt
− 1
np
dnpt
dt
(93)
1
c+ ωgc
dct
dt
c
c
+
ω
c+ ωgc
dgct
dt
gc
gc
= − 1
1− n
dnt
dt
n
n
+
1
y
dyt
dt
− 1
np
dnpt
dt
(94)
c
c+ ωgc
dct
dt
1
c
+
ωgc
c+ ωgc
dgct
dt
1
gc
= − n
1− n
dnt
dt
1
n
+
1
y
dyt
dt
− 1
np
dnpt
dt
(95)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
c
c+ ωgc
cˆt +
ωgc
c+ ωg
gˆct = −
n
1− nnˆ+ yˆt − nˆ
p
t (96)
Since
nˆ =
np
np + ng
nˆp +
ng
np + ng
nˆg, (97)
and noting that consumers are only choosing np, then
c
c+ ωgc
cˆt +
ωgc
c+ ωgc
gˆct = −
n
1− n
np
np + ng
nˆp + yˆt − nˆpt (98)
c
c+ ωgc
cˆt +
ωgc
c+ ωgc
gˆct = −
n
1− n
np
np + ng
nˆp + yˆt − nˆpt (99)
c
c+ ωgc
cˆt +
ωgc
c+ ωgc
gˆct = −
(
1 +
n
1− n
np
np + ng
)
nˆp + yˆt (100)
Since n = np + ng, it follows that
c
c+ ωgc
cˆt +
ωgc
c+ ωgc
gˆct = −
(
1 +
np
1− n
)
nˆp + yˆt (101)
c
c+ ωgc
cˆt +
ωgc
c+ ωgc
gˆct +
(
1 +
np
1− n
)
nˆp − yˆt = 0 (102)
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1.2.6 Linearized private capital accumulation
kpt+1 = it + (1− δp)kpt (103)
Take natural logs from both sides of the equation to obtain
ln kpt+1 = ln(it + (1− δp)kpt ) (104)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d ln kpt+1
dt
=
1
i+ (1− δp)kp
d(it + (1− δp)kpt )
dt
(105)
Observe that since
i = δpkp, it follows that i+ (1− δp)kp = δpkp + (1− δp)kp = kp. Then (106)
dkpt+1
dt
1
kp
=
1
kp
dit
dt
i
i
+
kp
i+ (1− δp)kpt
dkpt
dt
kp
kp
(107)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
kˆpt+1 =
δpkp
kp
iˆt +
(1− δp)kp
kp
kˆpt (108)
kˆpt+1 = δ
piˆt + (1− δp)kˆpt (109)
1.2.7 Linearized government capital accumulation
kgt+1 = g
i
t + (1− δg)kgt (110)
Take natural logs from both sides to obtain
ln kgt+1 = ln(g
i
t + (1− δg)kgt ) (111)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d ln kgt+1
dt
=
1
gi + (1− δg)kg
d(git + (1− δg)kgt )
dt
(112)
Observe that since
gi = δgkg, (113)
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it follows that
gi + (1− δg)kg = δgkg + (1− δg)kg = kg. (114)
Hence,
dkgt+1
dt
1
kg
=
1
kg
dgit
dt
gi
gi
+
kg
x+ (1− δg)
dkgt
dt
kg
kg
(115)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
kˆgt+1 =
δgkg
kg
gˆit +
(1− δg)kg
kg
kˆgt (116)
Cancel out the kg terms to obtain
kˆgt+1 = δ
ggˆit + (1− δg)kˆgt (117)
1.2.8 Public wage rate rule
wgt = η
− 1
2ρ
[
τ cct + τ
krtk
p
t − τ kδpkpt + τ lwptnpt − gct − gtt − git
1− τ l
] 1
2
(118)
Take logs from both sides to obtain
lnwgt = −
1
2ρ
ln η − 1
2
ln(1− τ l) +
1
2
ln
{
τ cct + τ
krtk
p
t − τ kδpkpt + τ lwptnpt − gct − gtt − git
}
(119)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d lnwgt
dt
=
1
2
d
dt
ln
{
τ cct + τ
krtk
p
t − τ kδpkpt + τ lwptnpt − gct − gtt − git
}
(120)
Observe that
τ krtk
p
t − τ kδpkt + τ lwptnpt = τ k(1− θ)yt + τ lθyt − τ kδpkpt =
=
[
τ k(1− θ) + τ lθ
]
yt − τ kδpkpt (121)
Also
(1− τ l)wgng = τ cc+ [τ k(1− θ) + τ lθ]y − τ kδpkp − gc − gi − gtt (122)
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Thus
dwgt
dt
1
wg
=
1
2
1
(1− τ l)wgng
{
τ c
dct
dt
+ [τ k(1− θ) + τ lθ]dyt
dt
− τ kδpdk
p
t
dt
− dg
c
t
dt
− dg
i
t
dt
− dg
t
t
dt
}
(123)
dwgt
dt
1
wg
=
1
2
1
(1− τ l)wgng ×{
τ c
dct
dt
c
c
+
[
τ k(1− θ) + τ lθ
]
dyt
dt
y
y
− τ kδpdk
p
t
dt
kp
kp
− dg
c
t
dt
gc
gc
− dg
i
t
dt
gi
gi
− dg
t
t
dt
gt
gt
}
(124)
dwgt
dt
1
wg
=
(1/2)τ cc
(1− τ l)wgng
dct
dt
1
c
+
(1/2)
[
τ k(1− θ) + τ lθ
]
y
(1− τ l)wgng
dyt
dt
1
y
− (1/2)τ
kδpkp
(1− τ l)wgng
dkpt
dt
1
kp
− (1/2)g
c
(1− τ l)wgng
dgct
dt
1
gc
− (1/2)g
i
(1− τ l)wgng
dgit
dt
1
gi
− (1/2)g
t
(1− τ l)wgng
dgtt
dt
1
gt
(125)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
wˆgt =
(1/2)τ cc
(1− τ l)wgng cˆt +
(1/2)
[
τ k(1− θ) + τ lθ
]
y
(1− τ l)wgng yˆt
− (1/2)τ
kδpkp
(1− τ l)wgng kˆt −
(1/2)gc
(1− τ l)wgng gˆ
c
t −
(1/2)gi
(1− τ l)wgng gˆ
i
t −
(1/2)gt
(1− τ l)wgng gˆ
t
t (126)
1.2.9 Public hours/employment rule
ngt = η
1
ρwgt (127)
Take logs from both sides to obtain
lnngt =
1
ρ
ln η + lnwgt (128)
Totally differentiate both sides to obtain
d lnngt
dt
=
d lnwgt
dt
(129)
dngt
dt
1
ng
=
dwgt
dt
1
wg
(130)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
nˆgt = wˆ
g
t (131)
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1.2.10 Total hours/employment
nt = n
g
t + n
p
t (132)
Take logs from both sides to obtain
lnnt = ln(n
g
t + n
p
t ) (133)
Totally differentiate to obtain
d lnnt
dt
=
d ln(ngt + n
p
t )
dt
(134)
dnt
dt
1
n
=
(
dngt
dt
+
dnpt
dt
)
1
n
(135)
dnt
dt
1
n
=
(
dngt
dt
ng
ng
+
dnpt
dt
np
np
)
1
n
(136)
dnt
dt
1
n
=
dngt
dt
1
ng
ng
n
+
dnpt
dt
1
np
np
n
(137)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
nˆt =
ng
n
nˆgt +
np
n
nˆpt (138)
1.2.11 Linearized private wage rate
wpt = θ
yt
npt
(139)
Take natural logarithms from both sides to obtain
lnwpt = ln θ + ln yt − lnnpt (140)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d lnwpt
dt
=
d ln θ
dt
+
d ln yt
dt
− d lnn
p
t
dt
(141)
Simplify to obtain
dwpt
dt
1
wp
=
dyt
dt
1
y
− dn
p
t
dt
1
np
(142)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
wˆpt = yˆt − nˆpt (143)
17
1.2.12 Linearized real interest rate
rt = θ
yt
kpt
(144)
Take natural logarithms from both sides to obtain
ln rt = ln θ + ln yt − ln kpt (145)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d ln rt
dt
=
d ln θ
dt
+
d ln yt
dt
− d ln k
p
t
dt
(146)
Simplify to obtain
dr
dt
1
r
=
dyt
dt
1
y
− dk
p
t
dt
1
kp
(147)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
rˆt = yˆt − kˆpt (148)
1.2.13 Public/private wage ratio
rwt = w
g
t /w
p
t (149)
Take logs from both sides of the equation
ln rwt = lnw
g
t − lnwpt (150)
Totally differentiate to obtain
d ln rwt
dt
=
d lnwgt
dt
− d lnw
p
t
dt
(151)
drwt
dt
1
rw
=
dwgt
dt
1
wg
− dw
p
t
dt
1
wp
(152)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
rˆwt = wˆ
g
t − wˆpt (153)
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1.2.14 Public/private hours/employment ratio
rlt = n
g
t/n
p
t (154)
Take logs from both sides of the equation
ln rlt = lnn
g
t − lnnpt (155)
Totally differentiate to obtain
d ln rlt
dt
=
d lnngt
dt
− d lnn
p
t
dt
(156)
drlt
dt
1
rl
=
dngt
dt
1
ng
− dn
p
t
dt
1
np
(157)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
rˆlt = nˆ
g
t − nˆpt (158)
1.2.15 Linearized technology shock process
ln at+1 = ρa ln at + 
a
t+1 (159)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d ln at+1
dt
= ρa
d ln at
dt
+
dat+1
dt
(160)
dat+1
dt
= ρa
dat
dt
+ at+1 (161)
where for t = 1
dat+1
dt
≈ ln(eat+1/ea) = at+1 − a = at+1 since a = 0. Pass to log-deviations
to obtain
aˆt+1 = ρaaˆt + 
a
t+1 (162)
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1.2.16 Linearized stochastic process for government consumption/output share
ln gcyt+1 = (1− ρg) ln gcy + ρg ln gcyt + ct+1 (163)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d ln gcyt+1
dt
= (1− ρg)d ln g
cy
dt
+ ρg
d ln gcyt
dt
+
dct+1
dt
(164)
dgcyt+1
dt
= ρg
dgcyt
dt
+ ct+1 (165)
where for t = 1
dct+1
dt
≈ ln(ect+1/ec) = ct+1− c = ct+1 since c = 0. Pass to log-deviations to
obtain
gˆcyt+1 = ρggˆ
cy
t + 
c
t+1 (166)
1.2.17 Linearized level of government consumption
gct = g
cy
t yt (167)
Take natural logarithms from both sides to obtain
ln gct = ln g
cy
t + ln yt (168)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d ln gct
dt
=
d ln gcyt
dt
+
d ln yt
dt
(169)
dgct
dt
1
gc
=
dgcyt
dt
1
gc
+
dyt
dt
1
y
(170)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
gˆct = gˆ
cy
t + yˆt (171)
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1.2.18 Linearized stochastic process for the government investment/output ra-
tio
ln giyt+1 = (1− ρi) ln giy + ρi ln giyt + it+1 (172)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d ln giyt+1
dt
= (1− ρi)d ln g
iy
dt
+ ρi
d ln giyt
dt
+
dit+1
dt
(173)
dgiyt+1
dt
= ρg
dgiyt
dt
+ it+1 (174)
where for t = 1
dit+1
dt
≈ ln(eit+1/ei) = it+1 − i = it+1 since i = 0. Pass to log-deviations to
obtain
gˆiyt+1 = ρigˆ
iy
t + 
i
t+1 (175)
1.2.19 Linearized level of government investment
git = g
iy
t yt (176)
Take natural logarithms from both sides to obtain
ln git = ln g
iy
t + ln yt (177)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d ln git
dt
=
d ln giyt
dt
+
d ln yt
dt
(178)
dgit
dt
1
gi
=
dgiyt
dt
1
gi
+
dyt
dt
1
y
(179)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
gˆit = gˆ
iy
t + yˆt (180)
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1.2.20 Linearized level of government transfers
gtt = g
tyyt (181)
Take natural logarithms from both sides to obtain
ln gtt = ln g
ty + ln yt (182)
Totally differentiate with respect to time to obtain
d ln gtt
dt
=
d ln gty
dt
+
d ln yt
dt
(183)
dgtt
dt
1
gt
=
dyt
dt
1
y
(184)
Pass to log-deviations to obtain
gˆtt = yˆt (185)
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1.3 Auto- and cross-correlation functions
As an additional test of model fit, this appendix compares auto- and cross-correlation func-
tions generated from the model with collective bargaining and Finn (1998) calibrated for
Germany, with their empirical counterparts. The main emphasis in this subsection is on the
ACFs and CCFs of labor market variables. In particular, close attention is paid to cyclical
properties of public and private wage rates and hours. To establish 95% confidence intervals
for the theoretical ACFs and CCFs, as in Gregory and Smith (1991), the simulated time
series are used to obtain 1000 ACFs and CCFs. The mean ACFs and CCFs are computed by
averaging across simulations, as well as the corresponding standard error across simulations.
Those moments allow for the lower and upper bounds for the ACFs confidence intervals to
be estimated. The empirical ACFs and CCFs are then plotted, together with the theoretical
ones. If empirical ACFs lie within the confidence region, this means that the calibrated
model fits data well.
Empirical ACFs and CCFs were generated from a Vector Auto-Regressive (VAR) process of
order 1. Since ACFs and CCFs are robust to identifying restrictions (Canova (2007), Ch.7),
the VAR(1) was left unrestricted. The figures on the following pages display empirical ACFs
(solid line), together with the simulated average ACFs (dashed line) and the corresponding
stochastic error bounds (dotted lines). This is done for the union model first , and then for
the calibration using Finn’s (1998) framework.
The model with the public sector union calibrated for Germany outperforms Finn (1998),
especially in the prediction of the dynamic behavior of labor market variables. In terms
of capturing the autocorrelation structure of the variables, the union model fits data quite
well. One exception is the public sector wage: in data, it is highly autocorrelated, while the
model generates low persistence. A possible explanation could be that the public union puts
weight also on last year’s public sector wage level, i.e. the union bargains over the public
wage increase rate, and not just the wage level. Public and total hours are also borderline
cases, as employment rates in data were used instead. In addition, the union model predicts
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Figure 1: Theoretical and empirical ACFs for Germany: Union
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Figure 2: Theoretical and empirical ACFs for Germany: Union
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Figure 3: Theoretical and empirical ACFs for Germany: Union
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Figure 4: Theoretical and empirical ACFs for Germany: Finn
27
Figure 5: Theoretical and empirical ACFs for Germany: Finn
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Figure 6: Theoretical and empirical ACFs for Germany: Finn
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perfect positive contemporaneous correlation between public wages and hours, while in data,
it is negative. Overall, the model with public sector union calibrated for Germany captures
the dynamic co-movement of hours and wages with output, consumption and investment.
In addition, union model is able to address and match some new dimensions such as the
dynamic correlation of the two wage rates and the pair of hours worked.
1.4 Sensitivity analysis
To evaluate the effect of structural parameters on the shape of the Laffer curves, this section
performs sensitivity analysis for different values of model parameters and how those affect
tax revenues. The two parameters of interest are the curvature parameter of household’s
Cobb-Douglas utility function α, as well as the weight on composite consumption, ψ. In-
terestingly, as α is allowed to vary, steady-state revenues are essentially unchanged. Even
an implausibly high value, α = 50, does not produce any difference in steady state tax rev-
enues. In both models considered in this paper, the preference parameter is not important
for steady-state fiscal policy effect. This result is not surprising in the literature, as Trabandt
and Uhlig (2010) obtain a very similar finding in their paper.1
In contrast, changes in the second parameter, ψ, yield significant differences. Both the
capital and labor tax Laffer curves, and the responses of the other tax bases to capital and
labor income tax rate are affected when ψ is allowed to vary.2 Higher values of ψ shift up
the Laffer curve and make it steeper, without significant change in its peak. The difference
between Finn and the model with endogenous public employment becomes significant for
implausibly high values of ψ, i.e. ψ > 0.5. (As explained in the calibration section, parame-
ter ψ = 0.296, describing household’s preference was calculated as the ratio of hours of work
out of total potential hours in the model.) Intuitively, a higher ψ corresponds to a lower
weight to leisure, (1− ψ), in the household’s utility function. In other words, a higher ψ
1Parameter α is important for model dynamics, though.
2Consumption tax Laffer curve proves to be very sensitive to ψ parameter. In the majority of the cases
it breaks down for values outside the benchmark value. This is also a typical result in the literature, e.g.
Trabandt and Uhlig (2010).
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Figure 7: Sensitivity analysis: Union
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Figure 8: Sensitivity analysis: Union
32
Figure 9: Sensitivity analysis: Finn
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Figure 10: Sensitivity analysis ψ: Finn
34
decreases the elasticity of private labor supply. Intuitively, when labor tax rate increases, or
equivalently, after tax private wage falls, private hours respond less, thus increasing labor
income tax revenue, as well as total tax revenue.
The effect of higher ψ on capital tax Laffer curve is similar to ψ’s effect on the labor tax
Laffer curve above. When τ k is allowed to vary, a higher weight attached to consumption in
household’s utility function, together with the optimality condition for the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and hours require private higher capital stock to finance
private consumption. Therefore, a higher ψ shifts the capital tax Laffer curve upward as
well.
1.5 Measuring conditional welfare
In steady state
u(c, gc, 1− n) = [(c+ ωg
c)ψ(1− n)(1−ψ)](1−α) − 1
1− α (186)
Let A and B denote two different regimes. The welfare gain, ζ, is the fraction of consumption
that is needed to complement household’s steady-state consumption in regime B so that the
household is indifferent between the two regimes. Thus
[(cA + ωgc,A)ψ(1− nA)(1−ψ)](1−α) − 1
1− α =
[((1 + ζ)cB + ωgc,B)ψ(1− nB)(1−ψ)](1−α) − 1
1− α (187)
Multiply both sides by (1− α) to obtain
[(cA + ωgc,A)ψ(1− nA)(1−ψ)](1−α) − 1 = [((1 + ζ)cB + ωgc,B)ψ(1− nB)(1−ψ)](1−α) − 1 (188)
Cancel −1 terms at both sides to obtain
[(cA + ωgc,A)ψ(1− nA)(1−ψ)](1−α) = [((1 + ζ)cB + ωgc,B)ψ(1− nB)(1−ψ)](1−α) (189)
Raise both sides to the power 1
1−α to obtain
(cA + ωgc,A)ψ(1− nA)(1−ψ) = ((1 + ζ)cB + ωgc,B)ψ(1− nB)(1−ψ) (190)
Divide throughout by (1− nB)(1−ψ) to obtain
((1 + ζ)cB + ωgc,B)ψ = (cA + ωgc,A)ψ
(
1− nA
1− nB
)(1−ψ)
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Raise both sides to the power 1/ψ to obtain
(1 + ζ)cB + ωgc,B = (cA + ωgc,A)
(
1− nA
1− nB
) (1−ψ)
ψ
(191)
Move ωgc,B term to the right to obtain
(1 + ζ)cB = (cA + ωgc,A)
(
1− nA
1− nB
) (1−ψ)
ψ
− ωgc,B (192)
Divide both sides by cB to obtain
1 + ζ =
1
cB
{
(cA + ωgc,A)
(
1− nA
1− nB
) (1−ψ)
ψ
− ωgc,B
}
(193)
Thus
ζ =
1
cB
{
(cA + ωgc,A)
(
1− nA
1− nB
) (1−ψ)
ψ
− ωgc,B
}
− 1 (194)
Note that if ζ > 0(< 0), there is a welfare gain (loss) of moving from B to A. In this paper
B is the initial scenario, while A will be the fiscal regime change.
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